We study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: EVERY player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.
Introduction
We study the problem of reaching Nash equilibria in multi-person games, where the players play the same game repeatedly. The main assumption, called uncoupledness (see Hart and Mas-Colell 2003) , is that every player knows only his own utility function. The resulting play of the game yields an uncoupled dynamic.
Hart and Mas-Colell show in 2003 that if the game is played in continuous time, and the moves of every player are deterministic, then uncoupled dynamics cannot always lead to Nash equilibria. In Hart and Mas-Colell (2006) they show that the situation is different when stochastic moves are allowed and the game is played in discrete time: if the players know the history of play, 1 then there are uncoupled strategies that lead to a Nash equilibrium. The question is whether it is necessary to know the whole history in order to reach a Nash equilibrium. The answer is no. It was proved in Hart 1 I.e., the past actions of all the players.
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Center for Study of Rationality and The Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: yak@math.huji.ac.il and Mas-Colell (2006) , Theorems 4 and 5, that under the assumption of uncoupledness, convergence of the long-run empirical distribution of play to a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed by using only the history of the last R periods of play, for some finite R. This is called a finite-recall strategy. Although finite-recall uncoupled strategies can guarantee convergence of the distribution of play to a Nash equilibrium, it is shown in Hart and Mas-Colell (2006) , Theorem 6, that this cannot hold for the period-by-period behavior probabilities. If however, instead of finite recall one uses finite memory (e.g., finitely many periods of history but not necessarily the last ones), then the convergence of the behavior can be guaranteed as well (Hart and Mas-Colell 2006, Theorem 7) .
This leads us to the study of uncoupled strategies with finite memory, i.e., finitestate automata. In this paper, we deal with convergence to pure Nash equilibria in games which have such equilibria. In Hart and Mas-Colell (2006) , Theorem 3, it is shown that in order to guarantee convergence to pure Nash equilibria one needs recall of size R = 2. Since finite recall is a special case of finite automata, the question we address here concerns the minimum number of states required for uncoupled finite automata to reach a pure Nash equilibrium. There are four classes of finite-state automata: the actions in every state can be deterministic (pure) or stochastic (mixed), and the transitions between states can be deterministic or stochastic. We will analyze each of the four classes in turn.
Section 2 presents the model, defines the relevant concepts and present the total results of the paper. Since the results are different for two-player games than for games with more than two players, we consider two-player games in Sect. 3 and n-player games for n ≥ 3 in Sect. 4. In Sects. 3 and 4, we discuss each of the four automata classes separately. Appendix A and Appendix B containing the proofs of Theorems 6 and 7.
The model

The game
A basic static (one-shot) game is given in strategic (or normal) form as follows. There are n ≥ 2 players, denoted i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each player i has a finite set of pure actions A i = {a i 1 , . . . , a i m i }; let A := A 1 × A 2 × · · · × A n be the set of action combinations. The payoff function (or utility function) of player i is a real-valued function u i : A → R. The set of mixed (or randomized) actions of player i is the probability simplex over A i , i.e., (A i ) = x i = x i a i j j=1,...,m i : m i j=1 x i (a i j ) = 1 and x i (a i j ) ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , m i ; payoff functions u i are multilinearly extended, and so u i : (A 1 ) × (A 2 ) × · · · × (A n ) → R.
We fix the set of players n and the action sets A i , and identify a game by its n-tuple of payoff functions U = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ). Let U i be the set of payoff functions of player i, and U := U 1 × · · · × U n .
Denote the actions of all the players except player i by a −i , i.e., a −i = (a 1
, . . . , a n j n ), and denote the set of actions of all the players except player i
An action a i j ∈ A i will be called a best
is a best reply to a −i for all i.
For every game U , let U = ( u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) denote the resulting best-reply game, which is defined by
Note that a is a pure Nash equilibrium of U if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of U .
The dynamic setup
The dynamic setup consists of the repeated play, at discrete-time periods t = 1, 2, . . . , of the static game U . Let a i (t) ∈ A i denote the action of player i at time t, and put a(t) = (a 1 (t), a 2 (t), . . . , a n (t)) ∈ A for the combination of actions at t. We assume that there is standard monitoring: at the end of period t each player i observes everyone's action, i.e., a(t); when the choices are random, the players observe only the realized actions a(t).
Automata
An automaton 2 for player i is a 4-tuple i :
is the set of states; s i 0 ∈ i is the starting state; f i : i → (A i ) is the action function; and g i : A × i → ( i ) is the transition function. Let A i denote the set of all automata of player i. An automaton i ∈ A i will be called a pure-action automaton if the actions in all states are pure, i.e., 3 Im( f i ) ⊂ A i . Otherwise it will be called a mixedaction automaton. An automaton i ∈ A i will be called a deterministic-transition automaton if all the transitions are deterministic, i.e., Im(g i ) ⊂ i . Otherwise it will be called a stochastic-transition automaton. An automaton i ∈ A i will be called a
. . , n ) be n automata, where i is a k i -automaton for player i. The play proceeds as follows. At time t = 1 every player i is at his starting state s i 0 , and plays an action a i (1) according to the probability distribution f i (s i 0 ). Let the realized actions of all the players be a(1) := (a 1 (1), . . . , a n (1)). Then every player i moves to a new state according to the transition probabilities g i (a(1), s i 0 ). Now assume that at time t player i is in state s i ∈ i , and hence at time t + 1 player i plays an action a i (t) according to the probability distribution f i (s i ). The actions of all the players are a(t + 1), and every player i then moves to a new state according to the transition probabilities g i (a(t + 1), s i ).
Strategy mappings
Let ϕ : U → A 1 × · · · × A n be a mapping that associates to every game U = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ U an n-tuple of automaton strategies ϕ(U ) = (ϕ 1 (U ), . . . , ϕ n (U )) (with ϕ i (U ) the automaton of player i). We will call the mapping ϕ uncoupled if, for each player i, the ith coordinate ϕ i of ϕ depends only on u i , i.e., ϕ i :
We will refer to ϕ i : U i → A i as an uncoupled strategy mapping to automata for player i; thus, ϕ i "constructs" an automaton for player i by considering u i only. 4 If
is an automaton of size (at most) k i for every payoff function u i ∈ U i , we will say that ϕ i is an uncoupled strategy mapping to k i -automata. Finally, we will say that the mapping ϕ is a Pure Nash mapping , or PN-mapping for short, if the strategies ϕ(U ) yield almost sure convergence of play to a pure Nash equilibrium in every game U ∈ U where such an equilibrium exists.
The results
Clearly, every finite-recall strategy is in particular a finite-automaton strategy. Indeed, a strategy with recall of size R can be implemented by an automaton of size |A| R = n i=1 m i R (i.e. one state for each possible recall). Therefore, by Theorem 3 in Hart and Mas-Colell (2006) , there is uncoupled PN-mapping to automata of size n i=1 m i 2 . The question we address here is whether there is uncoupled PN-mapping to automata with fewer states.
Our purpose is thus to characterize minimal numbers k 1 , . . . , k n such that there exists uncoupled PN-mapping where, for each i, the range is k i -automata. We will analyze each of the four cases (pure or mixed-action automata, and deterministic or stochastic-transition automata) separately.
The results are the following: For two-player games (n = 2):
• There exists uncoupled PN-mapping to automata of sizes:
mixed actions pure actions stochastic transitions
• There is no uncoupled PN-mapping to automata of sizes m 1 , m 2 . 4 We assume that every player i knows his index i.
For n-player games (n ≥ 3):
mixed actions pure actions stochastic transitions 2m i 2m i deterministic transitions Proof We define the mapping ϕ as follows: Given a game U = (u 1 , u 2 ), the automaton ϕ 1 (u 1 ) = 1 ∈ A 1 is constructed as follows : . In the states s 2 i , i ≥ 1, player 2 plays action a 2 i . He stays in this state if a 2 i is a best reply to the action of player 1; otherwise he moves to the state s 2 0 . Now we will prove that (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is a PN-mapping. We partition the space 1 × 2 of the automata states into four regions:
is a pure Nash equilibrium.
. These four regions clearly cover the space 1 × 2 . In fact, player 2 can be in the state s 2 0 (P 2 ) or in any other state (P 1 ∪ P 3 ∪ P 4 ). If player 2 is not in the state s 2 0 , then the action of player 2 can be a best reply (P 1 ∪ P 4 ) or not (P 3 ). If it is a best reply, then the action of player 1 can be a best reply (P 1 ) or not (P 4 )).
Players 1 and 2 stay at the same state if their action is a best reply; i.e., each state in P 1 is absorbing. We will prove that there is a positive probability of reaching a state from P 1 , in finitely many periods, from any other state s ∈ 1 × 2 .
Definition 2 An action a i
j ∈ A i of player i will be called dominant if for every a −i ∈ A −i a i j is a best reply to a −i .
i is a dominant action, then denote by a 2 l an action that is a best reply to a 1 i . Player 2 moves to s 2 l with probability
k an action such that a 1 i is not a best reply to it, and then with probability 1 m 2 player 2 plays action a 2 k . Now both players move randomly over all their states and with positive probability they will get to P 1 .
The actions are (a 1 i , a 2 j ); a 2 j is not a best reply. Therefore, player 2 moves to s 2 0 . Denote the state to which player 1 moves by
The actions are (a 1 i , a 2 j ); a 2 j is a best reply, and a 1 i is not. Therefore, player 2 stays in s 2 j , whereas player 1 move to s 1 k with probability 1 m 1 , where a 1 k is a best reply of player 1 to a 2 j . Now either
, depending on whether a 2 j is a best reply to a 1 k . In each of the above cases there is positive probability of reaching an absorbing state in P 1 in at most 3 steps.
Definition 3 A game U will be called a full game if, for every action a i j ∈ A i of every player i, there exists a −i ∈ A −i such that a i j is a best reply to a −i .
We prove a general result about n-player full games which will be useful in the sequel. Proof (By contradiction). Assume that there exists a full game U s.t. for player 1 the set B 1 j does not exist (or is empty). U is a full game, and so there exists a −1 ∈ A −1 such that a 1 j is a best reply to it. Consider the game U = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) when u 1 := u 1 ,
Lemma 4 Let
has been played, the next period player 1 will not play a 1 k with probability 1 (otherwise the set B 1 j could not be empty), and the equilibrium in the game U will never be reached with probability 1 (in contradiction to the assumption). 
Stochastic transitions and pure actions
We will show the result of Theorem 1 continues to hold when the automata are restricted to be pure-actions automata. As was shown in Theorem 5, however, there is no PN-mapping where the ranges of the players are smaller. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Deterministic transitions and mixed actions
We will show that there exists an uncoupled PN-mapping where the range for player i is (m i + 2)-automata. Clearly, every deterministic-transition automaton is a particular case of stochastic-transition automaton, and so Theorem 5 holds here as well. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Deterministic transitions and pure actions
In Theorem 13, we will show for general n-player games that there exists an uncoupled PN-mapping where the range for player i is (O(m i + n log n))-automata, where m i is the number of actions of player i and n is the number of players. In the case of 2 players, the construction of the automata in the proof of Theorem 13 proves the existence of uncoupled PN-mapping where the range for player i is (
Other uncoupled PN-mapping, specifically for 2 players, has a range of (5m 1 + m 2 − 5)-automata for player 1, and (5m 2 + 2m 1 − 9)-automata for player 2. We will not show this construction here but the idea is to go through all the possible actions (a 1 i , a 2 j ) in some "economical" way.
4 n-player games (n ≥ 3)
Stochastic transitions, and pure or mixed actions
We will show that there exists an uncoupled PN-mapping where the range for player i is 2m i -automata. On the other hand, we will show that there is no uncoupled PN-mapping whose range is smaller for all players. Definition 9 Given a state s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ 1 × · · · × n we will say that player i is fit at s if -player i is at a 0-state and player i + 1(mod n) is at a state s i j,k for k ∈ {0, 1} and j = 1, or -player i is at a 1-state and player i + 1(mod n) is at a state s i 1,k for k ∈ {0, 1}.
In every state s i j,l player i plays action a i j . If a i j is a best reply to what the other players played, and player i fits player i + 1(mod n), player i stays in s i j,l . Otherwise he moves to any one of the 2m i states with equal probability 1 2m i . Let the starting states be s i 0 := s i 1,0 . To prove that these automata reach a pure Nash equilibrium we partition the space 1 × · · · × n of the automata states into n + 2 regions:
) is a pure Nash equilibrium and all the players are fit}.
Note that for every pure Nash equilibrium (a 1
where the players play (a 1
with l i = 1 when k i+1 = 1 and l i = 0 otherwise.
For 0 ≤ r ≤ n − 1 P 2,r := {(s 1
there exist exactly r players that are fit}.
is not a pure Nash equilibrium}.
Clearly each state in P 1 is absorbing. Next we claim that a state in P 1 is reached with positive probability, in finitely many periods, from any other state s ∈ 1 × · · · × n .
s ∈ P 2,0 : all the players are not fit, and so all the players move randomly over all their states, and there is a positive probability of reaching P 1 .
Assume player i is fit, but player 5 i + 1 is not. Such i exist, because we have a circle of players of which some are fit, and some are not. There is a positive probability that all the players except i + 1 will stay at their states, and player i + 1 (who moves randomly because he is not fit) will move in the following way: if k i+1 = 1 then he moves to s . Now all the players except i and i + 1 remain fit/not fit, as they were before, because neither they nor the next player change their state. Player i + 1 does not change his l i+1 , player i + 2 does not change his state, and so player i + 1 stays not fit, as he was before. Player i was fit but after the move of player i + 1, he is not fit. The only player that changes his fitness is player i, and they get to P 2,r −1 . By induction, with positive probability they get to P 2,0 in r steps.
The action is a = (a 1   k 1 , . . . , a n k n ) and it is not a pure Nash equilibrium; therefore, there exists player i s.t. a i k i
is not a best reply to a −i , and player i moves randomly over all the states. Hence, there is a positive probability that all the players except i will stay at their states and player i will move to s i
. Now all the players except player i stay fitted, but player i do not fit. And so (s 1
From any state s there is a positive probability of reaching an absorbing state in P 1 in at most n + 2 steps. 
. , n, (except, perhaps, for one of them). Then there is no uncoupled strategy mapping to k i -automata with stochastic transitions and mixed actions, that guarantees almost sure convergence of play to a pure Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every game where such an equilibrium exists.
Proof Assume on the contrary that such a strategy mapping exists, and that k i < 2m i for all i = 2, . . . , n. By Lemma (2) Consider the following utility function of players 2, 3, 4: Players 3 and player 4 have the utility functions u 3 and u 4 , respectively. Therefore, the automaton that their strategy mapping constructs include states s 3 1 , s 4 1 , where they play action a 3 1 , a 4 1 , respectively, and stay there if it is a best reply. If players 3 and 4 get to the states s 3 k(3) and s 4 k(4) , then the pure Nash equilibrium will never be reached. For a larger number of actions the same proof works, if we take all the actions a i 2 , . . . , a i m i to be identical to the action a i 2 in this proof.
For a larger number of players we take the utility functions of players 2, 3, and 4 to be the same as in the case of 4 players and independent of the actions of the other player (1, 5, . . . , n). And in the game 1 the utility functions of players 5, . . . , n will be 1 if players 3 and 4 played the same action, and 0 otherwise.
Deterministic transitions and mixed actions
We will show that there exists an uncoupled PN-mapping such that the range for player i is (2m i + 3)-automata. Clearly, every deterministic-transition automaton is a particular case of stochastic-transition automaton, and so Theorem 10 holds here as well. 
Theorem 11
Deterministic transitions and pure actions
We will show that there exists an uncoupled PN-mapping such that the range for player i is O(m i + n log n)-automata. Clearly, every deterministic-transition automaton is a particular case of a stochastic-transition automaton, and so Theorem 10 holds here as well. 
Lemma 12
In any case β n + α m log m log n + α m log m = O(m + n log n). 
Theorem 13 Let k i
We will show that there exists a PN-mapping (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) such that the range of ϕ i is (4 p i + 3)-automata, and in doing so we will have concluded our proof.
We introduce the mappings is  (a 1  1 , . . . , a n 1 ) then the players will stay there. Second: if it is not, then all the players get to s i 1,1 simultaneously. We check the actions (a 1 1 , . . . , a n 1 ) separately, because in the continuation of the construction of the automata we will use the fact that (a 1 1 , . . . , a n 1 ) is not an equilibrium.
The If (a 1  1 , . . . , a n 1 ) was played, he moves to s i j+1,1 .
6 Every player i has to choose his number p i to construct his automaton. But he doesn't know the numbers of the other players: p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n . Yet we have to ensure that every player will choose a different number. Therefore, we have to define a choice function: χ : N n → (P RI M E) n , known to the players. The choice function chooses for every (m 1 , . . . , m n ) n prime numbers: χ(m 1 , . . . , m n ), and then every player i will choose the number
As an example of choice function, let {w k } ∞ k=1 be the sequence of all the prime numbers in increasing order.
For every i let k(i) be the minimal number such that , . . . , a n k n ) is an equilibrium, then all the players stay at the equilibrium all the time. Otherwise they all will move to Q 1 k 1 +1 , . . . , Q n k n +1 simultaneously. Since the players move from Q i j to Q i j+1 simultaneously, by the Chinese Remainder theorem it follows that they will visit every (Q 1
) is an equilibrium. Therefore, if a pure equilibrium exists, the automata will eventually reach it.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof We define the mapping ϕ as follows:
Given a game U = (u 1 , u 2 ), the automaton ϕ 1 (u 1 ) = 1 ∈ A 1 is constructed as follows:
Denote . Now we will prove that (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is PN-mapping. Let us consider two cases:
, b 2 is a dominant action. We partition the space 1 × 2 of the automata states into four regions:
These four regions clearly cover the space 1 × 2 (because player 2 can be in the state s 2 0 (P 2 ) or in any other state (P 1 ∪ P 3 ∪ P 4 ). The action of player 2 can be a best reply (P 1 ∪ P 4 ) or not (P 3 ). If it is a best reply, then the action of player 1 can be a best reply (P 1 ) or not (P 4 ).) Players 1 and 2 stay at the same state if their action is a best reply; i.e., each state in P 1 is absorbing. We will prove that there is a positive probability of reaching a state from P 1 , in finitely many periods, from any other state s ∈ 1 × 2 .
Wether a 1 i is a best reply or not, player 1 has a positive probability (1 or 1 m 1 correspondingly) to move to s 1 k , where a 1 k is a best reply of player 1 to b 2 . Player 2 will move to the state s 2 1 with probability
, where b 2 is a best reply to every action of player 1, in particular to
The actions are (a 1 i , a 2 j ); a 2 j is not a best reply. Therefore, player 2 moves to s 2 0 with probability
. Denote the state to which player 1 moves by
The actions are (a 1 i , a 2 j ); a 2 j is a best reply, a 1 i is not. Therefore, player 2 stays in s 2 j , and player 1 move to s 1 k with probability 1 m 1 , where a 1 k is a best reply of player 1 to a 2 j . Now either (s 1 k , s 2 j ) ∈ P 1 or (s 1 k , s 2 j ) ∈ P 3 , depending on whether a 2 j is a best reply to a 1 k .
In all the cases there is a positive probability of reaching an absorbing state in P 1 in at most 3 steps.
Case 2 There exists an action of player 1, say a 1 l , such that b 2 is not a best reply to it; i.e., there exists l = 1, . . . , m 1 such that u 2 (a 1 l , b 2 ) = 0. Before proving the Theorem, we will prove the following simple claim about the configuration of 0s and 1s in u 2 . This claim will be useful later.
Claim 1 If there exists
Proof (a) Otherwise there would be a column in u 2 that includes 1s only. By the assumption in this case there exist i = 1, . . . , m 1 , such that u 2 (a 1 i , b 2 ) = 0, which contradicts the fact that b 2 is the column with the maximal number of 1s. (b) There is some action a 2 j ∈ A 2 that is a best reply to the action a 1 i ∈ A 1 . This action satisfies u 2 (a 1 i , a 2 j ) = 1. (c) Otherwise the number of 1s in the j-th column would be bigger than in the first column.
We partition the space 1 × 2 of the automata states into regions: For every x, y, z ∈ {0, 1} put:
In words Q for a region we mean that player 2 is in the state s 2 0 , and by P we mean that he is not. There are three indices for region P, and two Boolean indices for region Q. The first index in P, Q corresponds to player 1 and indicates whether his action is a best reply (1) or not (0). The second index in P, Q corresponds similarly to player 2. The third index in P indicates whether action b 2 is a best reply to the action that player 1 played (1) or not (0).
Clearly ( ∪ x,y,z∈{0,1} P xyz ) = 1 × ( 2 \{s 2 0 }) and ( ∪ Consider the region P 11• . By the defn of P xyz we can see that
is a pure Nash equilibrium}. Players 1 and 2 stay at the same state if their action is a best reply; i.e., each state in P 11• is absorbing. If we can show that a state from P 11• is reached with positive probability, in finitely many periods, from all the other regions that we have already defined, then we will have concluded our proof. P 00• : This is the region of all the states where the actions of both players are not a best reply, and so both players move randomly over all their states, therefore, they reach a pure Nash equilibrium with probability ; i.e., they reach P 11• . Q 0• : Player 1's action is not a best reply, and player 2 is in state s 2 0 . Therefore, as before both players move randomly over all their states, and they reach P 11• with probability , as before. Q 11 : Player 1's action is a best reply and so he stays in the same state. Player 2 is in state s 2 0 and so he moves randomly over all his states. Player 2 will move to s 2 1 with probability 1 m 2 +1
, and they get to P 11• . P 101 : Player 1 stays, and player 2 randomizes. Since u 2 (a 1 i , b 2 ) = 1 player 2 will move to s 2 0 with probability
, and they get to Q 01 or Q 11 . P 010 : Player 1 randomizes and player 2 stays. By claim 1(c) there exists a 1 k ∈ A 1 such that
. Player 1 will move to s 1 k with probability 1 m 1 , and they get to P 001 or P 101 .
P 100 : Player 1 stays and player 2 randomizes. By claim 1(b) there exists a 2 j ∈ A 2 such that u 2 (a 1 i , a 2 j ) = 1. Player 2 will move to s 2 j with probability 1 m 2 +1 . Note that a 1 i does not change and so still u 2 (a 1 i , b 2 ) = 0 and they get to P 0,1,0 or P 110 (i.e., P •10 ). P 011 : Player 1 randomizes and player 2 stays. By claim 1(a) there exists a 1 k ∈ A 1 such that u 2 (a 1 k , a 2 j ) = 0. Player 1 will move to s 1 k with probability 1 m 1 , and they get to P 00• ∪ P 100 ∪ P 101 = P •0• . Q 10 : Player 1 stays and player 2 randomizes. Player 2 moves to s 2 1 with probability 1 m 2 +1
, and they get to P 100 . Thus, we have covered all the regions and shown that in at most 5 periods there is a positive probability of reaching the absorbing state P 11• . The regions cover all the space 1 × 2 , and so the automata will reach a pure Nash equilibrium when such an equilibrium exists with probability 1. In the state s iQ 01,> , Q 00,> : Similar to Q 00,≤ , Q 01,≤ Q ≤,00, Q ≤,01, Q >,01, Q >,00 : Symmetric to Q 00,≤, Q 01,≤, Q 01,>, Q 00,> P 4 : The action of one of the players is not a best reply to the action of the other, and so one of them will move to the state s 00 (i.e., s 1 00 or s 2 00 ). Hence, they get to one of the previous regions.
We have covered all the regions and shown that in at most 5 periods there is positive probability of reaching the absorbing state P 11• . The regions cover all the space 1 × 2 ; therefore, the mapping is PN-mapping.
In the other cases where the pure Nash equilibrium (a 1 k , a 2 l ) satisfies {k ≤ 2, l ≤ 2}, {k > 2, l ≤ 2}, or {k > 2, l > 2} the only difference is in how the regions P 2 and P 3 are defined. For example, for the case {k ≤ 2, l ≤ 2}, P 2 and P 3 will be defined by P 2 := {(s 1 01 , s 2 01 )} and P 3 := {(s 1 00 , s 2 00 ) ∪ (s 1 00 , s 2 01 ) ∪ (s 1 01 , s 2 00 )}.
